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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case concerns a medical researcher's failure to 
disclose his industry funding on a number of grant 
applications that he submitted to the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH). The undisclosed funding included several 
million dollars from pharmaceutical companies making the 
drugs that the NIH paid the researcher to evaluate. 
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On this appeal we must determine when a private party 
can properly bring a suit under the False Claims Act's qui 
tam provision, 31 U.S.C. S 3730(b), which allows an 
individual to sue on the government's behalf for damages 
caused by another party's false claims. Congress has 
changed several times the rules limiting when a private 
party can bring a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act. 
We must resolve which of two versions of the Act apply to 
the various grant applications that the researcher 
submitted to the NIH and what effect each version has on 
the claims it controls. 
 
A recent Supreme Court decision, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. 
United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871 
(1997), discussed the retroactivity of the 1986 Grassley 
Amendments, Congress's latest change to the Act's qui tam 
rules. Applying Hughes, the District Court concluded that 
Erdem Cantekin, the appellant, could not pursue qui tam 
claims based on grant applications that Charles Bluestone, 
the researcher and appellee, submitted before October 27, 
1986. Although our reasoning differs from the District 
Court's, we will affirm its ruling on these applications 
submitted in 1986 or earlier. 
 
For Cantekin's remaining qui tam claim, which was based 
on an application submitted after the effective date of the 
1986 amendments, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Bluestone and the other defendants 
because the Court concluded that Bluestone did not 
knowingly omit his industry funding from the application. 
Contrary to the District Court, we conclude that genuine 
factual disputes preclude summary judgment on whether 




Both the appellant, Erdem Cantekin, and the appellee, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The University of Pittsburgh and Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh 
joined Bluestone in applying for various grants and were also named as 
defendants. For convenience, we have referred throughout our opinion to 
the claims against Bluestone, but our analysis applies equally to the 
other named defendants. 
 
                                3 
  
Charles Bluestone, are professors of otolaryngology at the 
University of Pittsburgh's medical school and have worked 
together on research since the early 1970s. As part of their 
collaboration, they created the Otitis Media Research 
Center to investigate acute otitis media and otitis media 
with effusion, two ear diseases common in children. 
 
Much of the research they conducted together focused on 
testing the effectiveness of various antibiotics, such as 
amoxicillin, in treating the different types of otitis media. 
This research was particularly significant because while the 
drugs are widely used, controversy continues about the 
desirability and effectiveness of using antibiotics for these 
conditions. Not only are there medical reasons for worrying 
about unwarranted use of antibiotics, but also according to 
Cantekin's brief, the public spends over half a billion 
dollars annually buying antibiotics to treat the various 
forms of otitis media. 
 
To pursue the research on antibiotics, Bluestone 
submitted numerous grant applications to the NIH 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s and ultimately was 
awarded approximately $17.4 million. At the same time, 
Bluestone began receiving funding from various 
pharmaceutical companies to test the effectiveness of their 
antibiotics in treating otitis media. Collectively, this 
industry funding totaled approximately $3.4 million. 
 
Cantekin claims that as early as 1976, he raised with 
Bluestone his failure to list his industry funding on his NIH 
grant applications, but Bluestone allegedly brushed him off, 
saying that he was not going to tell the "federal feather 
merchants" because it was "none of their business" and 
would "muddy up the waters." App. at 523. Cantekin also 
disputed Bluestone's interpretation of research results, in 
particular the results of several industry-funded studies. 
 
In May of 1987, Cantekin wrote to the NIH complaining 
about Bluestone's conduct, but the NIH chose to take no 
action, instead deferring to an investigation conducted by 
the University of Pittsburgh. When the university 
announced on June 22, 1987 that it had cleared Bluestone 
of any wrongdoing, the NIH dropped the matter. 
Dissatisfied with the university's investigation and with the 
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NIH's reliance on it, Cantekin later testified before the 
United States House of Representatives at hearings 
investigating scientific fraud in federally funded research. 
 
While the congressional report from the hearings was 
pending, the NIH decided to conduct its own inquiry into 
Bluestone's conduct. The resulting report by Howard Hyatt, 
then director of the NIH's Division of Management Survey 
and Review, concluded that Bluestone and the Otitis Media 
Research Center had "not generally disclosed to NIH the 
extent of its industry-sponsored research." App. at 508. But 
Hyatt continued that since the grant instructions were 
ambiguous, Bluestone's conduct was excusable. Hyatt also 
rejected Cantekin's claim that Bluestone's research results 
were biased. 
 
On September 10, 1990, the House released its report, 
which discussed ten cases where grant recipients had 
engaged in misconduct. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-688, Are 
Scientific Misconduct and Conflict of Interest Hazardous to 
Our Health?, 19th Report, Committee on Government 
Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 10, 1990). 
Bluestone's case was included among the ten. The House 
report excoriated both the University of Pittsburgh's 
investigation as well as Hyatt's report and challenged many 
of their findings. Several months later, in December of 
1990, the NIH issued a new report by the agency's recently 
created Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI), which had 
reopened the agency's inquiry into Bluestone's conduct. Dr. 
Suzanne Hadley, then Acting Deputy Director of OSI, was 
in charge of this second NIH investigation. Her affidavit 
explained that the OSI report 
 
       recommended that the Director of NIH require that Dr. 
       Bluestone be place on a period of five years of 
       administrative oversight for having failed to disclose his 
       private pharmaceutical company research to NIH and 
       having analyzed the data from NIH-funded research in 
       a manner biased towards the effectiveness of the 
       antibiotics he had evaluated with public monies. 
 
App. at 481. 
 
To illuminate how Bluestone's failure to disclose his 
industry funding could have affected the NIH's approval of 
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his grants, Cantekin provided the following overview of the 
application process. Applications are first assigned to one of 
several institutes within the NIH. In Bluestone's case, his 
applications were sent to the National Institute for 
Neurological, Communication Disorders, and Stroke, which 
then forwarded them to the Communication Disorders 
Review Committee (CDRC), one of the review committees 
within the institute. A review committee is the body 
primarily responsible for evaluating the merits of 
applications like Bluestone's. Each review committee is 
composed of experts who are not NIH employees and are 
paid per diem for evaluating the applications. Frequently, 
the review committee members have themselves received 
NIH grants in conducting their own research. 
 
The review committee takes two votes on an application. 
The first vote is to "approve" or "disapprove" the requested 
grant; receiving approval at this stage, however, does not 
assure that the application will be funded. The application 
may still be rejected based on the second vote, which 
establishes a "priority score." To determine the priority 
score, each member of the review committee gives the 
proposal a score between 1, for the highest priority, and 5 
for the lowest. Each member's score is then added together, 
the total is divided by the number of members, and the 
resulting average is multiplied by 100, yielding thefinal 
priority score. Thus, the highest priority score possible is 
100 and the lowest 500. 
 
In 1984, Bluestone and Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh 
submitted an application to extend an earlier grant by five 
years. Their first request for an extension received a priority 
score of 154 and was not funded, but later Bluestone and 
the Otitis Media Research Center submitted a revised 
application that received a priority score of 131, which was 
good enough to receive funding. 
 
If we combine the NIH's method of calculating the priority 
score and the rough guideline that an application with a 
score of 154 or higher would not receive funding, at least 
around the time that Bluestone's application was 
considered, we can see that one or two members can easily 
raise an applicant's priority score above the cut-off for 
funding. For example, votes of 1, 1, 1, 1, and 5 yield a 
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priority score of 180; and votes of 1, 2, 1, 1, and 3 yield a 
score of 160. Even votes of 1, 1, 1, 1, and 3 could place an 
applicant on the edge of rejection with a priority score of 
140. 
 
After the priority vote, an executive secretary, who 
functions as a staff member for the committee, writes a 
report describing the review committee's deliberations and 
submits the report to the Council of the Institute. The 
council receives applications from the various review 
committees within the institute and makes the final 
determination of which applications will be funded. Council 
members, like the review committee members, are not NIH 
employees and are chosen for their expertise in their field. 
Unlike the review committee members, however, council 
members are appointed to serve for four-year terms. 
 
Once a multi-year grant has been approved for funding, 
NIH assigns the grant to a "program administrator," who is 
in charge of administering the grant. Each year the grant's 
principal investigator, Bluestone in our case, and the 
grantee institution must submit a special continuing 
application, or progress report. These progress reports are 
"noncompetitive" in that funding during the allotted time 
has already been approved. The purpose of the progress 
reports is to informed the NIH of how the research is 
advancing, identify the amount of the budget for the next 
year, and provide information about key personnel engaged 
in the research. 
 
Two of the five members of an NIH review committee that 
voted to approve one of Bluestone's grants stated in 
affidavits that if they had known about his industry 
funding, it would have affected their decision. Dr. Perkell, 
one of the review committee members, said that Bluestone's 
undisclosed industry funds were not "common knowledge." 
He continued: 
 
       [I]t is my opinion that had Dr. Bluestone disclosed his 
       relationships with the private pharmaceutical industry, 
       the competing renewal application of NS 16337 which 
       came before the Review Committee of which I was a 
       member would have been evaluated more critically with 
       regards to: demands on investigator time, possible 
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       conflicts of interest, the effects of bias on the value of 
       the proposed studies, safeguards in the study design to 
       ensure unbiased interpretation and evaluation of the 
       results of the proposed studies. The more critical 
       evaluation would have had an impact on the 
       recommendation for approval and on the priority score. 
       The impact on the priority score I gave would have 
       been material and negative. In my opinion, based on 
       my knowledge of past behavior of my fellow ]members 
       of the Review Committee in evaluating and assigning 
       priority scores to several hundred other applications 
       the impact on the overall priority funding score would 
       have been material and negative. 
 
App. at 473-74. 
 
Dr. Schwartz, the chair of the review committee, also 
stated in an affidavit that she was unaware of Bluestone's 
industry funding and that had she known, it would have 
had a "material and negative" effect on her evaluation of the 
application. She explained that a researcher who receives 
substantial funding from a pharmaceutical company can be 
subtly biased in favor of finding that the company's drugs 
are effective. Disclosure of this potential source of bias is 
important to reviewers even if the grant might be ultimately 
approved since the review committee might not approve the 
application until certain additional safeguards are 
implemented. "When bias, or potential bias, are revealed by 
disclosure of a funding source with a vested interest in the 
outcome of the research, reviewers are alerted to look for 
defects in the experimental design which could compromise 
the work proposed." App. at 1125. Elsewhere, she 
explained: 
 
       A bias experimenter can still perform valid work, but 
       the experiments must be carefully designed so that 
       enrolled patients are randomly assigned to different 
       test groups, objective criteria for measuring function 
       are used, and both subject and observer are blinded as 
       to which experimental condition (i.e. new drug, current 
       standard drug, or other control substance) applied to a 
       particular subject. Appropriate statistical tests must be 
       applied to the data to assure that interpretations of 
       efficacy of the test drugs are valid. 
 




The three other members of the review committee, Drs. 
Miller, Meyerhoff, and Goode, all submitted affidavits saying 
that they were aware of Bluestone's industry funding. Dr. 
Miller, for example, stated that "I was fully aware that Dr. 
Bluestone was receiving very substantial support from 
private pharmaceutical companies to do drug efficacy 
studies. . . . I was not at all troubled by the fact that Dr. 
Bluestone was receiving such funding." App. 1104-05. 
 
None of the three, however, informed Drs. Perkell or 
Schwartz of this outside funding. Dr. Schwartz's affidavit 
notes that the other committee members did not mention 
Bluestone's undisclosed funding at the review committee 
meetings, nor did they "raise the issue of possible conflicts 
of interest or of the adequacy of safeguards to control 





We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and 
we exercise plenary review of a district court's grant of 
summary judgment. Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 
F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 1998). On a motion for summary 
judgment, a court must determine whether the evidence 
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Factual disputes invoked 
to resist summary judgment must be both material in the 
sense of bearing on an essential element of the plaintiff 's 
claim and genuine in the sense that a reasonable jury could 
find in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510- 
12 (1986). A court should not prevent a case from being 
presented to the jury simply because the court favors one 
of several reasonable views of the evidence, for"the judge's 
function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine 
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 
S.Ct. at 2511. 
 




We begin with the threshold issue of which grant 
applications can be subject to a qui tam suit. Prior to the 
1986 amendments to the False Claims Act, a private party 
was barred from bringing a qui tam suit if the action was 
"based on evidence or information the Government had 
when the action was brought." 31 U.S.C. S 3730(b)(4) (1982 
ed.). The government itself, of course, could still bring suit 
for such a violation; only private parties were barred from 
seeking recovery. The implicit logic of the pre-1986 law was 
that if the government had the relevant information before 
the plaintiff initiated suit, then the government must be 
aware of the false claims and didn't need the assistance of 
private parties to ferret them out. And if the government 
knew about the information yet did nothing, then the 
government probably thought the suit meritless, and any 
private action was apt to be spurious, driven only by the 
lure of the Act's sizable damages. 
 
Despite the pre-1986 law's legitimate aim of preventing 
spurious suits, its bar for qui tam suits imperfectly 
achieved its purposes for a variety of reasons: 1) the 
government lacks the resources to investigate and 
prosecute all false claims even when the government has 
information revealing fraud; 2) a government official who is 
deemed to "have" the information may not recognize the 
connection between the information and a particular false 
claim; 3) the official may have an interest in not bringing 
the fraud to light for a number of reasons, such as an 
interest in protecting the official's or the agency's 
reputation; and 4) other mechanisms, more directly focused 
on the merits of a suit, are available for filtering out 
spurious claims. Congress was also concerned that under 
the old law, whistleblowers who came forward and exposed 
fraud to government officials before filing suit were later 
being barred from bringing a qui tam suit. Indeed, as our 
discussion below makes clear, Cantekin's case itself 
illustrates this consequence of the pre-1986 law. 
 
With the enactment of the Grassley Amendments, 
Congress generally gave greater scope to qui tam suits. 
Among other changes, such as increasing the damages 
from double to treble the harm caused, and increasing the 
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percentage that a qui tam plaintiff received of those 
damages, compare 31 U.S.C. SS 3730(a) and (c) (1982 ed.) 
with 31 U.S.C. SS 3730(d)(1) and (2), the amendments also 
eliminated the old law's bar to qui tam suits. 
 
Instead of prohibiting all qui tam suits that are based on 
information the government "has" when the suit is brought, 
the Grassley Amendments introduced a new standard: a qui 
tam suit will be barred only if it is based on information 
that was "publicly disclosed" at various hearings, in certain 
types of reports, or by the media. 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(A). 
Information that the government "has," but that was never 
publicly disclosed, does not bar a qui tam suit. Even if there 
is "public disclosure" within the meaning of the Grassley 
Amendments, a qui tam suit can still go forward if the 
plaintiff is an original source of that publicly disclosed 
information. 31 U.S.C. S 3730(e)(4)(B). An original source is 
defined as someone who has "direct and independent 
knowledge" of the information and who has "voluntarily 
provided" the government with the information before the 
suit was initiated. Id. 
 
Groundless suits are addressed in part by provisions 
requiring that all qui tam plaintiffs submit sealed 
information to the government before the suit proceeds. 
After reviewing this information, the government can decide 
whether to join the suit, allow the private party to continue 
alone, or, most significantly, dismiss the suit. See 31 U.S.C. 
SS 3730(b)(2) and (c)(2)(A). 
 
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 
520 U.S. 939, 117 S.Ct. 1871 (1997), the Supreme Court 
held that the 1986 amendments did not apply retroactively 
to conduct occurring prior to the amendment's effective 
date. The Court stated in a footnote, however, that since in 
Hughes both the "false claim submission" and the 
"disclosure to the government" of the fraud occurred before 
the effective date of the 1986 amendments, the Court did 
not have to address which of the two events should be used 
for determining retroactivity. 520 U.S. at 946, n. 4, 117 
S.Ct. at 1876, n.4. 
 
In applying Hughes, the District Court concluded that for 
all of Bluestone's grant applications submitted prior to the 
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1986 effective date, the date of "disclosure to the 
government" also occurred before October 27, 1986. Thus, 
the District Court decided that, as in Hughes, it did not 
have to resolve whether the disclosure date or the date of 
submission controls. 
 
Although the parties sharply dispute whether there was 
"disclosure to the government" prior to the 1986 effective 
date, we need not resolve the issue. We conclude that even 
though the Supreme Court did not expressly reach in 
Hughes whether retroactivity is determined based on the 
submission date or the disclosure date, the Court's analysis 
strongly supports using the former, i.e., the date the 
allegedly false claim was submitted. And once we use the 
submission date and apply the pre-1986 law to all grant 
applications submitted prior to the October 27, 1986 
effective date, there can be no doubt that before Cantekin 
began his qui tam suit, the government "had" the 
information upon which it was based. 
 
By the time Cantekin filed his complaint in the District 
Court on April 29, 1991, the House had conducted its 
hearings and issued its report, and the NIH had issued 
both Hyatt's memo and the later report by the Office of 
Scientific Integrity. These events unquestionably establish 
that the government had the information on which 
Cantekin's suit was based.2 Thus, the only live issue is why 
we should use the submission date for determining 
retroactivity. 
 
When the Supreme Court concluded in Hughes that the 
Grassley Amendments should not be applied retroactively, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Cantekin objects that when the District Court granted summary 
judgment against his pre-1986 claims, the Court erred by converting a 
12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment without first giving 
adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 
871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989). Cantekin raised this point in a motion 
for reconsideration, but the District Court rejected the argument, noting 
that under Rose a failure to give notice can be excused if "harmless." Id. 
Since we evaluate retroactivity based on the submission date, and since 
it is undisputed that Cantekin's suit was filed after the NIH and 
Congressional investigations, we conclude that any error stemming from 
the conversion of the motion was indeed harmless. 
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the Court recognized that knowingly submitting a false 
claim is illegal under both versions of the statute. The 
Court also noted that under both the amended statute and 
the previous statute, the total amount of a defendant's 
liability does not depend on who sued; the defendant must 
pay the same amount regardless of whether the government 
or a qui tam relator brought the action. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the amendment's change in 
when qui tam suits can be brought does impose new 
penalties on defendants. 
 
       While we acknowledge that the monetary liability faced 
       by an FCA defendant is the same whether the action is 
       brought by the Government or by a qui tam relator, the 
       1986 amendment eliminates a defense to a qui tam 
       suit -- prior disclosure to the Government -- and 
       therefore changes the substance of the existing cause 
       of action for qui tam defendants by "attach[ing] a new 
       disability, in respect to transactions or considerations 
       already past." 
 
520 U.S. at 948, 117 S.Ct. at 1877 (citations omitted). After 
noting that the 1986 amendments eliminate a defense, the 
Court commented that the amendments also in effect create 
a new cause of action because the courts are open to an 
expanded class of plaintiffs. 
 
We think this reasoning would be in deep tension, if not 
outright conflict, with using the date of disclosure instead 
of the date of submission for determining retroactivity. Our 
primary rationale is very simple. If we invoked the 
disclosure date to apply the amendments to a false claim 
submitted before the amendment's effective date, then the 
new penalties listed by the Court, i.e., the loss of a defense 
and the creation of a new cause of action, would be 
imposed after the defendant acted. The reason that using 
the disclosure date would have this effect is that the 
defendant's conduct ends with submitting the false claims; 
the defendant is not the one, or at least not usually, who 
makes the disclosure to the government. Since the Court 
rejected in Hughes an application of the Grassley 
Amendments that would allow the law to "attach new 
disabilities" to conduct committed prior to the amendment's 
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passage, we think the Court implicitly foreclosed using the 
disclosure date. 
 
Another problem with using the date of "disclosure to the 
government" to determine retroactivity is that it is not clear 
what test should be applied to determine that date. The 
Supreme Court's phrase "disclosure to the government," 
straddles the 1986 amendment's "public disclosure" 
language and the pre-1986 standard of "information the 
government had." By speaking of disclosure "to" the 
government, rather than disclosure "by" the government, 
the Supreme Court's language may suggest that the Court 
was referring to the pre-1986 "government knowledge" test. 
The "government knowledge" test is primarily focused on 
what other people release to the government while the 
amendment's "public disclosure" test has a substantial 
emphasis on information released by government . On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court's phrase, "disclosure to the 
government," does not accurately capture the pre-1986 law 
since the government could "have" the information within 
the meaning of the pre-1986 test based on what the 
government learned from its own investigative efforts. And 
by speaking of "disclosure," and not information the 
government "has," the Supreme Court's language is 
suggestive of the "public disclosure" test. 
 
Regardless of how one parses the language, however, the 
real problem is that choosing between the pre- and post- 
1986 standards injects a kind of circularity into the 
retroactivity analysis. To determine the date of"disclosure 
to the government," we must apply either the pre-or post- 
1986 test in order to decide whether we will apply the pre- 
or post-1986 test to the alleged false claim. This awkward 
need to stipulate at the outset what our analysis is 
supposed to decide reinforces our conclusion that the date 
the claim was submitted should determine the retroactivity 
of the Grassley Amendments.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is true that a court could apply pre-1986 law to assign a date to 
the 
"disclosure to the government" and yet stillfind that post-1986 law 
should ultimately control the claim. For example, suppose that after the 
defendant submitted a false claim in 1985, the plaintiff informed the 
government of the fraud in 1987, filed a qui tam suit in 1988, and 
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The District Court noted in passing that a Ninth Circuit 
opinion, decided before the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Hughes, relied on the disclosure date for determining the 
retroactivity of the Grassley Amendments. See United States 
ex rel. Anderson v. Northern Telecom., Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 
814 (9th Cir. 1995). The main problem with Anderson is 
that its reasoning rested heavily on the point that "the 1986 
amendment did not change the legal consequences of 
[defendant] Northern Telecom's conduct." 52 F.3d at 814. 
Since Hughes rejected that position and emphasized that 
the Grassley Amendments do "attach new disabilities" to a 
defendant's past conduct, we think that Anderson's 
authority has been undermined. In short, we conclude that 
we should use the date the claim was submitted for 
determining the retroactivity of the Grassley Amendment's 
"public disclosure" bar to qui tam suits. 
 
Did Bluestone knowingly submit false claims? 
 
Not all of Cantekin's claims were based on grant 
applications submitted prior to October 27, 1986. On 
January 28, 1987, Bluestone submitted a new grant 
application without listing his industry funding, and he 
again failed to disclose when he revised the application on 
May 1, 1987. The District Court dismissed Cantekin's qui 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
qualified as an original source. Even if we applied the pre-1986 law to 
date "disclosure to the government," we would not bar the plaintiff 's 
suit. This follows because the date that the government learned of the 
fraud, i.e., sometime in 1987, was after the effective date of the 1986 
amendments. And once we applied the amended law, we would see that 
the plaintiff could go forward with the suit since the plaintiff is an 
original source, and no public disclosure occurred aside from the 
plaintiff's suit. 
 
The circularity of our presupposing pre-1986 law isn't really 
eliminated, however, just because in a certain class of cases using the 
pre-1986 law to assign a date to disclosure leads us to apply post-1986 
law. We still need a justification for applying the pre-1986 law at the 
outset when it may foreclose many claims that the post-1986 disclosure 
test would not. We could, of course, appeal to the considerations cited in 
Hughes for using the pre-1986 law. But once we adopt those arguments, 
we have reason to abandon the "date of disclosure" altogether as a way 
of determining retroactivity. 
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tam claim based on this revised application because the 
Court concluded on summary judgment that the evidence 
"does not permit a finding that Dr. Bluestone`knowingly' 
submitted false or fraudulent claims to the government." 
App. at 1627. 
 
The False Claims Act defines "knowing" and"knowingly" 
as including a defendant's "actual knowledge," "deliberate 
ignorance," or "reckless disregard" of the truth or falsity of 
information in the defendant's claim to the government. 31 
U.S.C. S 3729(b). The statute adds that "no proof of specific 
intent to defraud is required." Id. In applying these 
standards to the record before us, we must heed the basic 
rule that a defendant's state of mind typically should not be 
decided on summary judgment. See, e.g. , Hunt v. 
Cromartie, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 1552 (1999). 
 
The District Court's primary rationale for granting 
summary judgment was that the grant application and 
instructions were unclear. Before we address whether the 
instructions are ambiguous, or more properly whether there 
is no genuine dispute that they are, we note that Cantekin 
stated in his affidavit that he specifically informed 
Bluestone that he should disclose his private funding. 
 
       In 1976, when Dr. Bluestone and I were applying for 
       various NIH grants, I raised with Dr. Bluestone the 
       question whether he, as principal investigator, should 
       not be disclosing to NIH his other research support, 
       especially from pharmaceutical companies. Dr. 
       Bluestone replied that it was "none of their business," 
       and that he was not going to tell the "federal feather 
       merchants" because it would "muddy up the waters." 
       Dr. Bluestone added that "idiots like Buckminster 
       Ranney would not understand." Dr. Buckminster 
       Ranney was an NIH-employee working with the 
       National Institute of Neurological, Communicative 
       Disorders, and Stroke ("NINCDS") with whom Dr. 
       Bluestone had dealt. 
 
App. at 523. This affidavit not only creates a genuine 
dispute that Bluestone "knowingly" omitted his industry 
funding, but it also provides evidence that Bluestone had 
the specific intent to defraud, proof of which is not required 
for a violation of the False Claims Act. 
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Even apart from the evidence that Bluestone was 
specifically informed that he should disclose his industry 
funding, we conclude that there is ample evidence that the 
instructions are clear. Other members of Bluestone's Otitis 
Media Research Center correctly followed the instructions 
and disclosed their outside research funding, including 
private sources. App. at 38. Similarly, one of the NIH review 
committee members, Schwartz, stated in his affidavit that: 
 
       I have written or helped to write numerous NIH grant 
       applications for fellowships, research grants, program 
       projects and training grants. As principal investigator I 
       have held an R01 grant from NIH which has been 
       continuously funded since 1972 involving seven 
       competing renewals and several revised resubmissions 
       . . . I have always found directions for completing the 
       "other support" pages of NIH grant applications to be 
       unambiguous. 
 
App. at 439-40. Another member of the review committee, 
Perkell, submitted a similar affidavit saying that he had 
applied for and received a number of NIH grants and found 
the "other support" section to be unambiguous. 
 
A review of the instructions themselves suggests that 
they clearly indicate that industry funding should be 
disclosed. On the page that instructs applicants to list their 
"other support," the form provides: 
 
       For each of the professionals named on page 2, list, in 
       three separate groups: (1) active support; (2) 
       applications pending review and/or funding; (3) 
       applications planned or being prepared for submission. 
       Include all Federal, non-Federal, and institutional 
       grant and contract support. If none, state "NONE." For 
       each item give the source of support, identifying 
       number, project title, name of principal investigator / 
       program director, time or percent of effort on the 
       project by professional named, annual direct costs, and 
       entire period of support. (If part of a larger project, 
       provide the titles of both the parent grant and the 
       subproject and give the annual direct costs for each.) 
       Briefly describe the contents of each item listed. If any 
       of these overlap, duplicate, or are being replaced or 
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       supplemented by the present application, justify and 
       delineate the nature and extent of the scientific and 
       budgetary overlaps and boundaries. 
 
App. at 1196 (emphasis in original). The instructions 
specifically request that the applicant list "all... non- 
Federal... support" and give detailed information about each 
grant. 
 
In concluding that the instructions were ambiguous, the 
District Court relied on Hyatt's report, which cited an 
earlier version of the instructions and said that"many 
institutions were found to interpret those instructions 
improperly." App. at 509. Hyatt explained that the NIH 
changed the instructions to avoid ambiguities. 
 
The District Court's reliance on Hyatt's memo is 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, Bluestone's 
post-1986 grant applications used the improved 
instructions. Second, even if potential confusion from the 
earlier applications was relevant, perhaps because the 
earlier instructions gave Bluestone erroneous expectations, 
we seriously question whether the earlier instructions were 
ambiguous. The instructions that Hyatt claimed were 
ambiguous read in part: 
 
       List all research support for each individual including 
       requests now being considered, as well as any 
       proposals being planned, regardless of relevance to this 
       application. Include also current awards, research 
       career program awards, training grants, regardless of 
       the source of support. 
 
App. at 509. Hyatt apparently believed that these 
instructions were ambiguous because, unlike the improved 
instructions, they did not specifically refer to"non-Federal" 
sources. The instructions did, however, direct applicants to 
list "all" research support "regardless of source" and 
"regardless of relevance." Hyatt claimed that"many" 
institutions had incorrectly interpreted the earlier 
instructions, but the drafter of the NIH forms testified that 
he could not recall any specific case, except Bluestone's of 
course, where a researcher misunderstood what was 
required by the "other support" question. 
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Third, the House report sharply criticized Hyatt's 
conclusions and explained that: 
 
       NIH officials were incorrect in describing the content of 
       the NIH forms; the section regarding "Other Support" 
       was revised in late 1979 and revised forms, containing 
       the more explicit language were available to applicants 
       in 1980 or 1981, depending on the type of application. 
 
App. at 38. 
 
Fourth, Dr. Hadley, the Acting Deputy Director of the 
NIH's Office of Scientific Integrity, asserted in her affidavit 
that she had not encountered any evidence that applicants 
found the instructions to be ambiguous. 
 
       In my opinion and based on my [prior] experience as 
       an Executive Secretary [who works with review 
       committees in evaluating grant applications,]... there 
       was never any problem with ambiguity in PHS 
       instructions on how to complete the "Other Support" 
       section of a PHS Grant Application or Continuation 
       Application. From Fall, 1979 on, the instructions 
       explicitly required the disclosure of all sources of 
       support, both federal and non-federal. 
 
App. at 482. 
 
Finally, one can infer that Bluestone, a highly-educated 
professional, would have been aware that the NIH might be 
interested in his industry ties when the agency decided 
whether to award him substantial funding to test a key 
drug in a half-billion dollar industry. As Cantekin points 
out, people are likely to give much greater weight to NIH 
research than to the findings of companies making the 
drugs at issue. Given this greater public trust in the results 
of government-funded research, and the undeniable risks of 
bias, the government clearly has a strong interest in 
ensuring that it acts as an impartial investigator, especially 
when investigating treatments that have a disputed efficacy 
and a high aggregate cost. Bluestone can be reasonably 
expected to know of the government's heightened interest in 
avoiding bias. As a scientist, he must be fully aware that 
rooting out potential sources of bias in our interpretations 
of empirical data is central to scientific inquiry. 
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The District Court and the appellees' next argument is 
that in the materials accompanying some of Bluestone's 
applications, there were references to his industry funding. 
These references were by no means complete disclosures of 
the grants he was receiving from pharmaceutical 
companies, nor did the references include the full 
information, such as the amount of the funding, that was 
requested in the "Other Support" section of the grant 
application. Furthermore, many of the references that the 
appellees rely upon were included with "progress reports," 
which were submitted after a grant was approved. But the 
most important point is that scattered references buried in 
voluminous accompanying materials do not comply with 
the application's disclosure requirements. 
 
When a reviewer is faced with complex proposals that 
include large masses of accompanying information, it 
makes sense to insist that the applicants must disclose in 
one place the applicant's other grants that may raise 
conflicts of interests or impose competing demands on the 
applicant's time. A reviewer who is reading an applicant's 
accompanying journal article may not notice, while 
engrossed in the details of a specialized scientific issue, a 
fleeting reference to private funding and think of its 
significance for potential conflicts of interest. Applications 
distill and organize information for a reason. 
 
Evidence in the record bears out this point. One of the 
review committee members, Perkell, stated in his affidavit 
that: 
 
       As a grant reviewer and evaluator I have always looked 
       to the "Other Support" pages to form an estimate of the 
       percentage of effort the Principal Investigator and other 
       investigators have available to do the proposed work, to 
       look for possible overlap between proposed projects 
       and others already funded or pending, and to identify 
       possible conflicts of interest or possible sources of bias 
       in the experiments. These factors are important to me 
       in evaluating an application as a whole and in 
       assigning it a priority score. 
 
App. at 472. Schwartz, another review committee member, 
likewise stated in her affidavit that she relies on the "Other 
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Support" section to gauge how much time the applicant has 
to spend on the research, whether the proposal is 
duplicative, and what conflicts of interest the applicant 
might have. Despite the references Bluestone cites in the 
accompanying materials, neither Schwartz nor Perkell was 
aware of Bluestone's industry funding, and both said it 
would have affected their evaluation of his application. 
 
The District Court's last reason for concluding that 
Bluestone did not knowingly submit a false claim is that he 
sent a letter on June 23, 1987 to Elkins, his program 
administrator, listing his industry funding. Wefind the 
District Court's reliance on this letter unconvincing. Not 
only was it written months after Bluestone submitted his 
application in January and May of 1987, but more 
important, the letter was only sent after he was under 
investigation. Given that Bluestone only sent the letter after 
Cantekin made his allegations to the NIH and the 
university, the timing of the letter tends to reinforce, not 
undermine, Cantekin's allegations that Bluestone knew 
that he was supposed to disclose his industry funding. One 
can easily infer that the letter was not an expression of an 
honest oversight, but an attempt to cover up prior 
misconduct and limit its damage. 
 
Cantekin alleges that program administrators' interests 
are more closely allied with grant applicants' than any 
other NIH official, so it is noteworthy that Bluestone chose 
to notify Elkins, and Elkins alone, at the NIH. Reading the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
if Bluestone calculated that disclosure to Elkins would be 
the least damaging step he could take, his judgment 
apparently proved correct since the letter he sent to Elkins 
was never forwarded beyond the program-administration 
offices. 
 
Another problem with relying on Bluestone's letter to 
Elkins as a way of exonerating him for submitting a false 
claim is that the False Claims Act has a specific provision 
dealing with someone who comes forward and discloses his 
or her false claims. The statute provides that: 
 
       [I]f the court finds that -- 
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       (A) the person committing the violation of this 
       subsection furnished officials of the United States 
       responsible for investigating false claims violations with 
       all information known to such person about the 
       violation within 30 days after the date on which the 
       defendant first obtained the information; 
 
       (B) such person fully cooperated with any Government 
       investigation of such violation; and 
 
       (C) at the time such person furnished the United States 
       with the information about the violation, no criminal 
       prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had 
       commenced under this title with respect to such 
       violation, and the person did not have actual 
       knowledge of the existence of an investigation into 
       such violation; 
 
       the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount 
       of damages which the Government sustains because of 
       the act of the person. A person violating this 
       subsection shall also be liable to the United States 
       Government for the costs of a civil action brought to 
       recover any such penalty or damages. 
 
31 U.S.C. S 3729(a)(7). 
 
The first point worth noting is that this provision merely 
reduces the defendant's liability from treble to double 
damages; it does not exonerate a defendant for a violation. 
Second, Bluestone's letter of June 23 was more than 30 
days after the date he made his false statements. Third, 
Bluestone's letter was sent after he was under 
investigation, and thus he arguably cannot satisfy 
subsection (C). It also may be open to dispute whether he 
has "fully cooperated" or provided "all information" that he 
knew about the violation. 
 
Taking up a different issue, the District Court cited 
United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266- 
67 (9th Cir. 1996) for the proposition that a "technical 
violation of rules and regulations of an agency is not 
actionable under the FCA." App. at 1627. What the Ninth 
Circuit held in Hopper, however, was that not every 
regulatory violation is tantamount to making a knowingly 
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false statement to the government. Since the regulatory 
violation in Hopper did not involve making a knowingly 
false statement in a claim submitted to the government, the 
court held there was no violation of the False Claims Act. 
Thus, Hopper does not stand for the proposition that before 
a court allows a suit to proceed under the False Claims Act, 
it must weigh how serious it thinks a particular knowing 
falsehood was in a claim submitted to the government. 
 
Although we reject the District Court's reading of Hopper, 
the Court's remark about "technical violations" suggests 
two slightly different objections: Bluestone's omissions were 
not material, and even if they were, they did not cause any 
damages to the government. We will consider first the 
materiality objection. 
 
Courts have held that claims under the False Claims Act 
are subject to a judicially imposed materiality requirement. 
See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 
176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999). And the Supreme Court 
recently held in Neder v. United States,_U.S._, 119 S.Ct. 
1827 (1999) that there is a materiality requirement under 
the federal mail-fraud, wire-fraud, and bank-fraud statutes. 
In a footnote, the Supreme Court indicated, however, that 
the term "false statement," unlike "fraudulent statement," 
does not imply a materiality requirement. Neder, 119 S.Ct. 
at 1840 n.7. Given that the False Claims Act prohibits 
merely making a knowingly false claim and does not require 
a specific intent to defraud, perhaps Neder argues against 
a materiality requirement. In any event, we need not decide 
whether there is a materiality requirement under the False 
Claims Act, because even if there is, we think it is clear 
that Bluestone's failure to disclose his industry funding 
would readily qualify as material. In Neder, the Supreme 
Court quoted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which provides two alternatives for showing that a matter is 
material: 
 
       (a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its 
       existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of 
       action in the transaction in question: or 
 
       (b) the maker of the representation knows or has 
       reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to 
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       regard the matter as important in determining his 
       choice of action, although a reasonable man would not 
       so regard it. 
 
Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1840 n.5 (quoting  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts S 538 (1976)). 
 
As recounted above, industry funding is relevant for 
assessing conflicts of interest, how much time an applicant 
has to devote to the requested NIH grant, and how the 
research fits within a broader research program. Because 
the NIH specifically requests the information on its form, 
and because the value of this information is readily 
apparent, we think that the information is material: a 
reasonable NIH grant applicant would know that the NIH 
regards the information as important. 
 
We turn now to the issue of damages. Even if the letter 
to Elkins does little to undermine Cantekin's claim that 
Bluestone knowingly submit false claims, the appellees 
argue that the letter still shows that his earlier failure to 
disclose caused no harm. Bluestone sent the letter to 
Elkins on June 23, 1987, but his pending post-1986 
application was not finally approved until February 4, 
1988, when he was awarded $321,137. The appellees 
argue, therefore, that no harm could have been caused 
because Bluestone disclosed his industry funding before 
any grant money was dispensed for his post-1986 grant 
application. 
 
The first problem with this argument is that, as noted 
above, the letter to Elkins never left the program- 
administration offices, so the information about Bluestone's 
industry funding never reached the review committee or 
any other decisionmaker involved in approving Bluestone's 
grant. Thus, we do not know whether the review committee 
or the council of the institute would have approved the 
grant if they had known about the information included in 
the letter. Given that two committee members who reviewed 
Bluestone's application in 1984 and 1985 would have 
assigned lower priority scores to his application, and given 
that one member's vote can effectively deny funding, we 
think whether the grant would have been approved and 
what damages were incurred raise genuine factual 
 
                                24 
  
disputes. We also want to point out that even if the review 
committee and council would have approved the application 
once they knew about the industry funding, they still might 
have imposed additional safeguards or requirements. 
Having not been informed, they did not have an opportunity 
to consider these other intermediate steps. 
 
It may seem unfair to hold Bluestone accountable for the 
decision made in the program-administration offices not to 
pass along Bluestone's letter. As noted above, however, the 
statute expressly provides a mechanism for dealing with a 
defendant who reveals his false claim. Since this provision 
merely reduces the defendant's liability for the damages 
actually caused, and since, in any event, Bluestone may 
not satisfy the prerequisites, Bluestone remains liable for 
the harm that in fact was caused to the government as a 
result of his false statements. 
 
It is a basic principle of tort law that once a defendant 
sets in motion a tort, the defendant is generally liable for 
the damages ultimately caused, unless there are 
intervening causes. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 
S 44 (5th ed. 1984). Analysis of intervening causes is often 
used as a way of evaluating and assigning responsibility for 
harm caused. Id. Given that Bluestone only sent his letter 
after he was under the pressure of investigation, his letter 
does little to lessen his culpability, and therefore, the fact 
that the letter was not forwarded is not plausibly treated as 
an intervening cause. To the extent that analysis of 
intervening causes focuses on the foreseeability of a 
putative intervening cause, we think it is significant that 
Bluestone chose to send the letter to Elkins, his program 
administrator, who did not decide whether he would receive 
funding for his application. Bluestone did not, for instance, 
submit another revised application as he did earlier in the 
spring. In short, the fact that the letter was not forwarded 
was a risk that Bluestone assumed when he submitted the 
claims. 
 
The appellees have directed our attention to several cases 
discussing causation requirements under the False Claims 
Act. In United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 957 F.2d 
1362 (7th Cir. 1992) the court held that the government 
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only needed to show that it would not have made a 
payment "but for" the false statement. In reaching that 
holding, the Seventh Circuit expressly disagreed with 
United States v. Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1977), which, 
according to Cicero, imposed a more stringent causation 
requirement. Specifically, Cicero said that in addition to 
requiring that the government would not have paid the 
claim but for the false statement, Hibbs effectively held that 
the "subject matter of the false statement . . . be the source 
of the government's loss." 957 F.2d at 1373 (citing Hibbs, 
568 F.2d at 349, 351). We need not decide either whether 
Hibbs should be read as imposing such a requirement, or 
whether Hibbs is consistent with the changes made in the 
False Claims Act since that decision. We think it suffices to 
point out that both standards can be satisfied: as we 
concluded in our discussion of damages, Cantekin has 
presented evidence that Bluestone's grant might not have 
been approved but for his false statements about his 
industry funding (or that the grant would have been 
approved with additional restrictions or requirements). And 
the content of Bluestone's omissions about his industry 
funding could have made the difference in whether his 
grant was approved or not, so even under the Seventh 
Circuit's reading of Hibbs, the "subject matter of the false 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court dated February 9, 1998 and reverse the 
order dated September 4, 1998. Each party to bear its own 
costs. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
Because, in my view, (1) the uncontradicted evidence 
establishes that responsible government employees knew of 
the private funding and alleged conflict of interest prior to 
the effective date of the Grassley Amendments; (2) the 
instructions to applicants are clear and unambiguous on 
their face; and (3) Dr. Cantekin's affidavit alone establishes 
a dispute of fact as to whether Dr. Bluestone knowingly 
submitted false claims, I join the judgment of the Court. 
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